Brenda E. Rivera and Antonio R. Rivera v. Clayton S. Wilde M.D. : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Brenda E. Rivera and Antonio R. Rivera v. Clayton
S. Wilde M.D. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elliott J. Williams; Williams and Hunt; Attorneys for Respondent
Robert B. Sykes; Tamara J. Hauge; Sykes and Vilos, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Rivera v. Wilde, No. 930366 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5283
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS^ CC^T CF ATPCALS 
UTAH 
BRENDA E. RIVERA, 
Appellant, 
v. 
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D., 
Respondent. 
ANTONIO R. RIVERA, By and Through 
his Guardian Ad Litem, TONY RIVERA, 
also known as Antonio R. Rivera, 
Appellant, 
v. 
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D., 
Respondent. 
POCUMEiN I 
K F U 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal No. 930366-CA 
(Consolidated Cases) 
-cA 
Priority No. 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Honorable Michael Murphy, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
ROBERT B. SYKES 
TAMARA J. HAUGE 
SYKES & VILOS, P.C. 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0222 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-5678 
Attorneys for Respondent ADD 1 jCM 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENDA E. RIVERA, ] 
Appellant, ;] 
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D., ] 
Respondent. ] 
ANTONIO R. RIVERA, By and Through ; 
his Guardian Ad Litem, TONY RIVERA, ; 
also known as Antonio R. Rivera, ] 
Appellant, ] 
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D., ] 
Respondent. ] 
} COURT OF APPEALS 
) Appeal No. 930366-CA 
i (Consolidated Cases) 
i Priority No. 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Honorable Michael Murphy, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
ROBERT B. SYKES 
TAMARA J. HAUGE 
SYKES & VILOS, P.C. 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0222 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-5678 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS iv 
REPLY POINT I 
THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN 
UTAH: IS A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER IN A. MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CASE HELD TO A "REASONABLE PRUDENCE" 
OR A "CUSTOMARY PRACTICE" STANDARD OF CARE? THIS 
COURT SHOULD ADOPT "REASONABLE PRUDENCE." . . . 1 
A. Introduction . . . 1 
B. Reasonahle Prudence Test: Fair. Safe. Logical and 
the Trend 2 
C. Reasonable Prudence and Helling 4 
D. Helling and Reasonable Prudence in die State of Washington . . 5 
E. Helling and Reasonable Prudence in Other Jurisdictions 6 
F. The Requirement of Medical Expertise to Establish Reasonable 
Prudence 7 
REPLY POINT II 
DR. WILDE'S RECITATION OF FACTS, CITATION OF CASES 
AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD ARE INACCURATE AND 
UNRELIABLE. MRS. RIVERA ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT 9 
A. inaccurate Statement of Positions 9 
B. Rivera Adequately Marshaled the Evidence 11 
c Dr. Wade's Qualifications and Testimony 13 
D. Dr. Wilde Quotes Medical Literature Out of Context 15 
E. Erroneous Claim That Appellant Advocates Strict Liability . . 18 
F. Conclusion 22 
REPLY POINT III 
DR. WELDE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF SAFETY. IT IS 
NOT SAFE TO WAIT FOR PROTEINURIA OR A 140/90 BLOOD 
PRESSURE BEFORE TAKING ACTION TO PROTECT A 
PATIENT 22 
REPLY POINT IV 
DR. WADE WAS WELL QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY AND HIS 
TESTIMONY WAS WELL-SUPPORTED BY THE MEDICAL 
LITERATURE 23 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 25 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH CASES 
Dixon v. Stewart. 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) 18 
Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981) . . . . . . 3 
Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) 8 
Robh v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993) 12, 18 
Swan v. Lamb. 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978) 3 
OTHER CASES 
Barton v. Owen. 71 Cal, App.3d 484, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494 (1977) 6 
Douglas v. Bussaharger. 73 Wash.2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968) 8 
Gates v. Jensen. 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979) 4, 5 
George B. Gilmore Co. v. Garrett. 582 So.2d 387 (Miss. 1991) 6 
Golden Villa Nursing Homer Inc. v. Smith. 674 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.App.-- Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) 7 
Hall v. Hilhun. 466 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1985) . 6 
Harris v. Groth. 663 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1983) 5, 8 
Helling v. Carey. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) 4, 5, 5-7, 9 
Hernandez v. Nueces County Medical Society Community Blood Bank 779 S.W.2d 
867 (Tex. App. 1989) 6, 7 
Incollingo v. Ewing. 282 A.2d 206 (Penn. 1971) 7 
Kalsheck v. Westview Clinic, P.A.. 375 N.W.2d 861 (Minn.App. 1985) . . 7 
Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital. 622 P.2d 1246 (Wash. 1980) 5 
McNeil v. U.S.. 519 F.Supp. 283 (D. Ct. S. Carolina 1981) 7 
Meeks v. Marx. 550 P.2d 1158 (Wash. App. 1976) 5 
iii 
Richards v. Qverlake Hospital Medical Center. 796 P.2d 737 (Wash. App. 1990) 6, 
8 
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital. 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984) 6 
Turner v. Children's Hospital. Inc.. 602 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio App. 1991) 6 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Black's Law Dictionary. 5th Ed. p. 1239 (West Publishing Company 1979) . . . 22 
King, 28 Vand.L.Rev. 1213 (1975) 8 
Prosser and Keaton, Law of Torts. Ch. 5, Section 33 (5th Ed. 1984) 2 
W. Prosser, Law of Torts Section 32 (5th ed. Supp.1988) 2 
Williams Obstetrics. 18th Ed., Cunningham, MacDonald & Gant, Appleton & 
Lange, 1989 16, 21 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory provisions 
relevant to this appeal. 
iv 
REPLY POINT I 
THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF FIRST 
IMPRESSION IN UTAH: IS A HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDER IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE 
HELD TO A "REASONABLE PRUDENCE- OR A 
"CUSTOMARY PRACTICE" STANDARD OF 
CARE? THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT 
"REASONABLE PRUDENCE." 
A. Introduction 
After reading Dr. Wilde's Brief it appears to appellant that resolution of 
this appeal requires the Court to address a legal question of first impression in Utah: 
whether a health care provider in a medical malpractice case is to be held to a 
"reasonable prudence" or to a "customary practice" standard of care, viz., a standard 
of care based solely on professional custom. A search of Utah malpractice cases reveals 
that the issue has never been squarely dealt with by a Utah appellate court. The 
national trend is the "reasonable prudence" standard and rejection of the "customary 
practice" standard. This is an appropriate case for the Court to clearly rule on the 
appropriate standard. Appellant invites the Court to adopt the "reasonable prudence" 
standard and align Utah with the growing number of states which reject the customary 
practice standard. Doctors should not be able to escape liability on the ground that they 
follow custom when such custom is unreasonable and dangerous. Under "reasonable 
prudence," the trial court's finding of safety in the case subjudice is clearly erroneous. 
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B. Reasonable Prudence Test: Fair. SafeT 
Logical and the Trend 
Dr. Wilde advocates the antiquated, arbitrary and unjustifiable regime of 
allowing custom to be the sole criteria in establishing the standard of care. Prosser 
states that "[a]n increasing number of courts are rejecting the customary practice 
standard in favor of a reasonable care or reasonably prudent doctor standard." W. 
Prosser, Law of Torts Section 32 (5th ed. Supp.1988) (emphasis added).1 According 
to Prosser, "proof of medical custom then becomes relevant to. but not conclusive on. 
the issue of due care, consistent with the general tort law rule." Id. (emphasis added) 
Discussing that general tort law rule Prosser states: 
[Cjustoms and usages themselves are many and various; some are the 
result of careful thought and decision, while others arise from the kind 
of inadvertence, carelessness, indifference, cost-paring [sic] and corner-
cutting that normally is associated with negligence. There can certainly 
be such a thing as customary negligence, as the unchecked habit of 
jaywalking in some communities may suggest. 
Even an entire industry, by adopting such careless methods to save time, 
effort or money, cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled 
standard. ... And if the only test is to be what has been done before, 
no industry or group will ever have any great incentive to make progress 
in the direction of safety. Cases will no doubt be infrequent in which 
any defendant will be held liable for failing to do what no one in his 
position has ever done before; but there appears to be no doubt that they 
can arise. Much the better view, therefore, is that of the great majority 
of the cases, that every custom is not conclusive merely because it is a 
custom, that it must meet the challenge of "learned reason." and be given 
only the evidentiary weight which the situation deserves, [footnotes 
omitted] (emphasis added) 
Prosser and Keaton, Law of Torts, Ch. 5, Section 33, p. 194 (5th Ed. 1984). 
This trend is exactly the opposite of how Dr. Wilde presents it. 
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While appellant believes that the standard of care issue in this case is 
truly one of first impression, there have been judicial expressions in Utah which appear 
to favor the reasonable prudence standard. In opting for the "similar locality rule" over 
the "same locality rule" the Utah Supreme Court in Swan v. Lamb. 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 
1978) stated: 
... it beggars the imagination to think a doctor in Salt Lake City could 
escape responsibility for harm done to his patient by failing to remove 
the substance [dye from spinal canal] merely because the local custom is 
to leave the substance in the canal so that it will be absorbed by the 
body. If this procedure is generally regarded to be unsatisfactory or 
dangerous, no doctor should escape responsibility merely because the 
local practice has not yet adopted it. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 817, 818. And in Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981), Justice Stewart 
stated: 
In Swan v. Lamb, supra, this Court held that a doctor in Salt Lake City 
should be held to the same standard of care as that which prevailed in 
similar localities. It was observed that the "similar locality" rule is "but 
a specialized application of the standard of conduct so universally 
imposed by the law: of requiring the degree of care which the ordinary, 
reasonable and prudent person would observe under the same or similar 
circumstances." (Crockett, J., concurring specially, 584 P.2d at 819.) 
(emphasis added) 
Id. at 537. 
Rivera asks this court to adopt the better standard of care in medical 
malpractice actions of "reasonable prudence" and to reject the illogical, unsafe, and 
unfair "customary practice" standard advocated by Dr. Wilde. The facts of this case 
offer the court a prime opportunity to adopt the reasonable prudence standard because 
the undisputed evidence established by expert testimony and authoritative medical 
literature is that Dr. Wilde's customary practice standard is unsafe. Dr. Wilde's 
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standard is based solely on the considerations, discussed above by Prosser, of saving 
time and effort, and making money. Appellant's Brief at 48-49. 
C. Reasonable Prudence and Helling 
Dr. Wilde mischaracterizes appellant's reasonable prudence position 
(Appellant's Brief pp. 24-27) as advocating: 
... a form of strict liability for physicians determined retrospectively on 
an ad hoc basis. The Appellant's position would permit judges and juries 
to create standards of care from their own expectation of medicine, 
however high, rather than upon the testimony of medical experts. In 
support of this proposition, the Appellant relies upon an obscure and 
discredited decision, Helling v. Carey. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). 
Respondent's (hereinafter "Wilde's") Brief p. 22. Dr. Wilde levels additional 
disparaging remarks about Helling, implying that no one else follows it, the national 
trends are against it and that it is limited to its facts. See Wilde's Brief pp. 22-24. 
These are grossly inaccurate characterizations. 
Helling belongs to that respected and well-established line of 
jurisprudence which disallows establishment of professional standards of care based 
solely upon negligent custom. In Helling, the Supreme Court of Washington held that 
"reasonable prudence may require a standard of care higher than that exercised by the 
relevant professional group." Gates v. Jensen. 595 P.2d919. 921 (Wash. 19791 Since 
the undisputed medical testimony was that a simple and harmless pressure test would 
detect the devastating disease of glaucoma, all nine justices agreed that the customary 
practice of not administering the test to individuals under 40, based on the rareness of 
the disease, was negligent as a matter of law. Helling at 983. 
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D. Helling and Reasonable Prudence in the State of 
Washington 
Contrary to Dr. Wilde's assertions, Helling has been followed and 
extended to all medical malpractice cases in the state of Washington; it has been directly 
endorsed by name in several other jurisdictions; and is adhered to in principle by the 
great majority of cases addressing the role of custom in establishing a legal standard of 
care. In Harris v. Groth. 663 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1983), the Supreme Court of 
Washington, En Banc, upheld the Helling decision and made clear that all health care 
providers (not just ophthalmologists) in medical malpractice actions were to be held to 
a standard of care of reasonable prudence and not the "average practitioner" standard.2 
Id. at 116-118. See also Gates, supra and Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital. 622 P.2d 
1246 (Wash. 1980). 
Defendant's citation of the 1976 Washington Court of Appeals decision, 
Meeks v. Marx. 550 P.2d 1158 (Wash. App. 1976), misstates the current status of the 
law in Washington. See Wilde's Brief p. 24. The later decisions in Harris. Gates, and 
Keogan3 (1983, 1979 and 1980) established that the court of appeals in Meeks 
erroneously interpreted legislation as limiting Helling to "its own 'unique' facts." 
2
 In its opinion, the court explained the history of the legal standard of care to which health care 
providers were held following the Helling decision. The court noted that Helling "aroused great controversy" 
and that health care providers "fearing the worst ... sought aid from the Legislature in reversing what they 
viewed as an unjustified judicial intrusion into health care." Id. at 116. The court then noted that several bills 
were passed by the Washington Legislature and that the prevailing view among the commentators had been that 
these bills were intended to overrule Helling and reestablish professional custom as the sole criteria in 
determining the standard of care. Id- The Harris court, noting that this contention was in part rejected in Gates, 
goes on to fully reject the idea that legislation had restored the customary practice standard. 
3
 Gates and Keogan. like Helling, have remarkable similarities to the case subjudice, and 
plaintiff solicits the court's attention to them. 
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Wilde's Brief p. 24. Dr. Wilde erred in not directing this court to the later cases by 
a higher court. See fti 2, supra. Additionally, Richards v. Qverlake Hospital Medical 
Center. 796 P.2d 737 (Wash. App. 1990) cited in support of points with which 
appellant agrees, also affirms directly or indirectly, the holding in Helling. Helling, 
contrary to Dr. Wilde's assertion of being emaciated, is alive, well, and thriving in the 
State of Washington. 
E. Helling and Reasonable Prudence in Other 
Jurisdictions 
Dr. Wilde claims Helling has remained in an "appropriate place of 
obscurity in American jurisprudence," citing but one California appellate opinion. 
Wilde's Brief p. 23. Dr. Wilde fails to note that Helling was cited favorably by another 
California appellate court, Barton v. Owen. 71 Cal. App.3d 484, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494 
(1977), and has been directly endorsed by name in at least the following cases: 
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital. 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984); George B. 
Gilmore Co. v. Garrett. 582 So.2d 387 (Miss. 1991); Hall v. Hilbun. 466 So.2d 856 
(Miss. 1985); Turner v. Children's Hospital. Inc.. 602 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio App. 1991); 
and Hernandez v. Nueces County Medical Society Community Blood Bank. 779 S. W.2d 
867 (Tex. App. 1989). 
For example, in Hernandez a patient brought a negligence action against 
a blood bank for failing to conduct surrogate tests which could indicate the presence or 
likelihood of hepatitis. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment stating: 
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It is well-established that state health regulations, national standards, and 
organizational bylaws are admissible to define the standard of care 
customarily offered; however, such evidence does not usually 
conclusively establish that a health care provider fulfilled its duty of care 
to its patients and it does not necessarily preclude a finding of 
negligence. Golden Villa Nursing Home. Inc. v. Smith, 674 S.W.2d 
343, 349 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.). 
Rather, evidence of such standards performs the same function as does 
evidence of custom, in that it is only one factor to consider when 
determining good, prudent medical care. Cf. Helling v. Carey. 83 
Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974). 
Hernandez. 779 S.W.2d 781. Many other courts have followed the same reasonable 
prudence doctrine adopted by Helling. See, for example, Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, 
P.A.. 375 N.W.2d 861 (Minn.App. 1985); McNeil v. U.S.. 519 F.Supp. 283 (D. Ct. 
S. Carolina 1981); Incollingo v. Ewing. 282 A.2d 206 (Penn. 1971). 
F. The Requirement of Medical Expertise to 
Establish Reasonable Prudence 
Defendant additionally mischaracterizes Appellant's Brief as asking this 
court "to overturn decades of well-established case law" and substitute the wisdom of 
judges and juries "for that of the medical community in determining how to 
appropriately diagnose and treat a medical complication of pregnancy." Wilde's Brief 
p. 21. Nothing could be further from the truth. Appellant whole-heartedly agrees with 
Dr. Wilde's claims that medical expertise is generally required to establish the standard 
of care. Appellant acknowledges that medical expertise was certainly required and 
furnished in the case subjudice. 
Dr. Wilde's misguided attack was obviously inspired by commentary 
claiming that the Helling court had "unwisely ... arrogated to itself medical 
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decisions...." King, 28 Vand.L.Rev. 1213, 1250 (1975). But the author of that article 
conceded: 
In the final analysis, Helling rejected the professional standard as applied 
to routine glaucoma testing and potentially rejected the professional 
standard for other medical procedures as well, especially if the 
procedures do not involve an extensive exercise of professional discretion 
or judgment, [footnote omitted] (emphasis added) 
Id. at 1248. Helling, like the Utah case of Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1980), was not a case where the reasonableness and safety of the act or omission was 
"outside the common knowledge and experience of the layman." Id. at 352. 
The Washington Court of Appeals has addressed fears expressed from 
critics of Helling by stating: 
The standard of care against which a health care provider is judged is 
generally established by expert testimony. Douglas v. Bussabarger. 73 
Wash.2d 476, 479, 438 P.2d 829 (1968). This requirement has evolved 
to a standard of reasonably prudent medical care. Reasonably prudent 
medical care is not within the knowledge of lay persons. Harris v. 
Robert C. Groth. M.D.. Inc.. 99 Wash.2d 438, 449 n. 6, 663 P.2d 113 
(1983). Thus, although the standard of care is not restricted to what is 
actually practiced, it must be determined by reference to expert testimony 
as to what is reasonably prudent, (emphasis added) 
Richards, at 744-45. Thus, expert testimony is required, but customary practice is not 
the sole criteria. 
Dr. Wilde cites this same passage for the proposition that "Helling 
notwithstanding, expert testimony is still necessary to establish whether a specific 
treatment is 'reasonably prudent.'" No one disputes the point. Appellant introduced 
extensive expert testimony and literature establishing the unsafeness and 
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unreasonableness of Dr. Wilde's customary practice standard of care. It would appear 
that the only one being "haunted" by Helling is Dr. Wilde. Dr. Wilde's Brief p. 24. 
REPLY POINT H 
DR. WILDE'S RECITATION OF FACTS, 
CITATION OF CASES AND CITATIONS TO THE 
RECORD ARE INACCURATE AND UNRELIABLE. 
MRS. RIVERA ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT. 
Many of Dr. Wilde's citations to the record are inaccurate. They 
misstate or omit significant portions of trial testimony and case law. The overall result 
is that Dr. Wilde's Brief is seriously flawed, incomplete and unreliable. 
A. Inaccurate Statement of Positions 
Dr. Wilde states his position thusly: he followed an accepted "clinical 
definition" for diagnosing preeclampsia, i.e., blood pressure of 140/90 plus proteinuria, 
which is recognized by respected and competent obstetricians. Wilde's Brief, p. 11; 
Wilde T. 1253. There was evidence at trial of this definition. However, Dr. Wilde's 
entire Point I (Wilde's Brief, p. 7-18) is actually a misleading, "straw man" argument, 
that incorrectly characterizes the issue on appeal as a dispute over "definitions." This 
case is not about the definition of preeclampsia! No one disputes defendant's argument 
that an accepted school of thought "defines" preeclampsia as blood pressure of 140/90 
(systolic over diastolic) with proteinuria.4 But does the lack of these symptoms 
4
 There also exists an accepted school of thought that defines preeclampsia as 140/90 plus 
proteinuria or edema, or, as to blood pressure, an increase of 15 DBP or 30 SBP (diastolic and systolic) over 
base line. Plaintiff presented with a 24 DBP increase and complaining of edema and thus was preeclamptic 
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necessarily mean the patient does not have preeclampsia, or is it safe to wait for these 
symptoms to develop when the patient may have or be developing preeclampsia without 
them? Explanation is in order. 
By way of analogy, suppose a patient presents with bone protruding 
through the skin of her arm and complaining of pain. There would be a presumptive 
diagnosis of a broken arm. That is not difficult. However, while protruding bone 
through the flesh presumptively indicates a diagnosis of broken arm, the lack thereof 
doesn't necessarily mean that the arm isn't broken. If the arm is only swelling, it could 
be a break or a sprain. Only an x-ray will tell. Another example: A bad cough could 
be pneumonia, or something else. Pneumonia can develop quickly, with fatal 
consequences. Can the family doctor send the patient away for two weeks without a 
warning or interim follow-up? 
If a patient walks in the door and presents herself with a blood pressure 
of 140/90 plus proteinuria, she has preeclampsia, by definition, and should be treated 
accordingly. Everyone agrees. It is a presumptive diagnosis. The real issue here is: 
can Dr. Wilde presumptively conclude Brenda does not have preeclampsia just because 
she doesn't have blood pressure of 140/90 plus proteinuria? Can he schedule her next 
appointment for two weeks away, when it is undisputed (and admitted by Dr. Wilde) 
that some women have both preeclampsia and eclampsia without ever reaching 140/90 
and without ever having proteinuria? When these two conditions (140/90 plus 
proteinuria) are the sine qua non of Dr. Wilde's "definition" and can undisputedly 
under this definition. 
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develop within days in a patient headed that direction, it can't be safe to have Brenda 
come back in two weeks! Not having 140/90 or not having proteinuria does not 
presumptively mean Brenda does not have or is not developing preeclampsia. Dr. 
Wilde erred by so concluding. He erred when he concluded he could await the presence 
of such symptoms before acting and that he could wait two weeks before the next visit. 
He erred by not warning Brenda. 
Appellant has proved that such a standard is unsafe because many women 
may have preeclampsia, and even eclampsia, without ever having 140/90 and without 
ever having proteinuria. A doctor can't wait for these bright-line criteria to develop, 
when they may not show before the patient is seriously injured. Accordingly, it is 
inaccurate and unfair for defendant to characterize appellant's position as a dispute over 
the definition of preeclampsia. 
B. Rivera Adequately Marshaled the Evidence 
The defendant first claims that appellant failed to marshal "all the 
evidence.M This ignores Point I.C of Appellant's Brief, pages 18 through 20, in which 
appellant details six main categories covering all aspects of Dr. Wilde's evidence 
on the only issue appellant challenges: The safety of Dr. Wilde's standard. The 
arguments are fairly stated from Dr. Wilde's viewpoint. Each of the points is well 
documented with citations to the record which allow a thorough review of the evidence. 
For example, appellant referenced Dr. Wilde's testimony on 15 separate pages. R. 
1253, 1255,1256, 1257,1258,1259, 1260,1270, 1293, 1294, 1309, 1313, 1314,1320 
and 1321. Dr. Farnsworth's testimony is referenced on 10 different pages. R. 1116, 
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1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1128, 1155, 1156, 1159 and 1160. There are also multiple 
references to many pages. There is no need to be redundant. 
Defendant then claims that appellant" s marshaling of the evidence is 
insufficient because appellant failed to "separately set forth" the evidence which supports 
each separate finding. Wilde's Brief at page 9. Defendant claims that Robb v. 
Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993) requires this. To the contrary, this case 
specifically held: 
Here, appellant does not meet his marshaling burden. Instead, appellant 
argues only selective evidence favorable to his position without 
presenting the evidence supporting the trial court's finding: we therefore 
affirm this finding, (emphasis added) 
863 P.2d 1322 at 1327. Appellant is required only to "present the evidence" supporting 
the finding; not to necessarily "separately" set the evidence forth. Dr. Wilde has 
therefore inaccurately characterized the Robb holding. 
Dr. Wilde ironically admits that the same evidence which supports the 
court's Finding 10 also substantiates Finding ll .5 Wilde's Brief at page 13. That's 
appellant's point exactly. All of the findings that Rivera challenges, in fact, deal with 
basically one issue: whether Dr. Wilde's standard of care ("wait until she develops 
140/90 and proteinuria") was "safe." All the challenged findings are therefore 
supported by the same body of evidence which Rivera broke down into six categories. 
Thus, Rivera's marshaling of the evidence is adequate. 
5
 A further irony: Dr. Wilde's Brief complains on page 12 that defendant neglected to mention a 
point "when she marshaled the evidence ..." This is an admission of sorts that plaintiff did marshal the 
evidence. 
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C. Dr. Wade's Qualifications and Testimony 
Dr. Wilde inaccurately recounts both Dr. Wade's qualifications and some 
of his testimony.6 He claims that Rivera's "own expert," Dr. Maclyn Wade, agreed at 
trial that Dr. Wilde's definition of hypertension was "consistent with an accepted school 
of thought which is within the standard of care." Wilde's Brief at page 12. This is 
a gross distortion of Dr. Wade's testimony, which was that hypertension could be 
"defined" as any diastolic pressure over 90, but that if "rising pressures" are not 
followed, "its not an option clinically that he [Wilde] can accept." Wade T. 1034: 25, 
1035:1-3. Dr. Wade clearly disagreed on the record with defendant's position that "no 
action" is an accepted option prior to the diastolic pressure reaching 90. Nor did Dr. 
Wade agree that edema of the hands and face and weight gain are insignificant in the 
diagnosis of preeclampsia, as represented by defendant on page 12 of his Brief. Wade 
T. 921:21-26, 922, 923. While Dr. Wade admitted that there was such a school of 
thought, he denied that it was "safe," stating, "... sure you can dismiss it. You can 
do anything. But you can being [sic] dangerous for your patients too." Wade T. 1041-
1042:6. To imply that Dr. Wade agreed that it was safe to dismiss the symptom of 
edema misstates the record. 
Elsewhere Dr. Wilde makes this astonishing claim about Dr. Wade: 
All of the expert witnesses, including the Appellant's own, agreed that 
the standard of care Dr. Wilde followed is recognized and accepted by 
In a paradoxical lapse, Dr. Wilde ardently attacks Dr. Wade's credentials, while at the same 
time citing his testimony favorably 8 times. Defendant's Brief, pp. 12 (Wade T. 1034, 1041, 1044), 17 (Wade 
T. 1047, 1048, 1032) and 26 (Wade T. 1047 and 1048). 
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competent and qualified obstetricians in this and similar communities 
throughout the country. 
Wilde's Brief, p. 20. Dr. Wilde provides no citation to the record, as required by the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, making it impossible to verify this claim. There 
is, in fact, no portion of the record in which Dr. Wade agrees that Dr. Wilde followed 
a recognized and accepted standard of care by having appellant wait until she developed 
140/90 and proteinuria for treatment, or wait two weeks for her next appointment, or 
not warn appellant of preeclampsia on her 6-15-89 visit. Instead, Dr. Wade stated again 
and again, buttressed by volumes of undisputed literature, that although there is an 
accepted "definition" of preeclampsia as blood pressure of 140 over 90 with proteinuria, 
it is not safe nor accepted to await treatment until the symptoms reach that point, 
because protein in the urine is a late-developing sign, and rising diastolic pressure alone, 
even without protein in the urine, is dangerous to the mother and baby. Wade T. 856, 
866, 904, 908, 912, 913, 914, 915, 972, 973, 974, 977, 1042: 21-25, 1043:1-11. Dr. 
Wade certainly agreed with the presumptive definitions7 regarding preeclampsia and 
hypertension, but he did not agree that Dr. Wilde's standard of waiting was safe. 
On page 26 of his Brief, Dr. Wilde cites Dr. Wade's testimony in support 
of the claim that swelling of the feet occurs in 80% of all pregnancies. The portion of 
Dr. Wade's testimony cited (Wade T. 1047-8) contains no reference to this figure, nor 
does Dr. Wilde's testimony establish this fact. Dr. Wilde's testimony was in reference 
to an article in the medical literature which describes one study. Thus, the source of 
140 SBP/90 DBP in the presence of proteinuria. 
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this statistic is inaccurately presented, i.e., as having been proved with regard to ail 
pregnancies, and that Dr. Wade was in agreement with the figure, which he was not. 
In summary, Dr. Wade's testimony is seriously misstated. 
Dr. Wilde also misstates Dr. Wade's experience in obstetrics. He claims 
on page 14 of his Brief that Dr. Wade delivered only one or two babies a month during 
his career. This statement is distorted because it is only true for the 1980-1989 period, 
which was the end of Dr. Wade's active obstetrics practice, a fact not mentioned by 
defendant. Wade T. 1028:13-14. It also omits the six years that Dr. Wade delivered 
10-15 babies per month, Wade T. 842, and omits his participation in multiple deliveries 
per day during part of his career. Id.8 
Dr. Wilde also claims that Dr. Wade testified in "1500 depositions," 
Wilde's Brief, p. 14, when Dr. Wade's actual testimony was that he had given 
"hundreds" of depositions. Wade T. 1023:6-11. In short, Dr. Wilde's portrayal of Dr. 
Wade's qualifications and testimony is seriously flawed. 
D. Dr. Wilde Quotes Medical Literature Out of Context 
Wilde's Brief quotes important medical literature out of context -
omitting nearly all portions necessary for contextual understanding.9 The defendant 
easily found literature that claims certain symptoms are not useful to diagnose 
8
 Credentials of Dr. Wade omitted by defendant include: Vice-chairman of the Department of 
Obstetrics, University of California at Los Angeles for 6 years, and Director, Department of 
Obstetrics/Gynecology, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, California, for 18 years. T. 841, Exhibit 
15, p.3. 
9
 At trial, Dr. Wilde also brazenly quoted literature out-of-context. See examples in Appellant's 
Brief, pps. 40-42. 
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preeclampsia. Those same sources, however, also warn that while a patient may not 
have reached the point of a presumptive diagnosis, the presence of these symptoms 
warrants increased vigilance and cannot be safely ignored. This is the case with the 
"bible" of obstetrics - Williams on Obstetrics - which Dr. Wilde claims supports his 
case. Wilde's Brief at page 13. While Williams adopts the presumptive definition of 
preeclampsia, it also warns against ignoring rising blood pressures in the later half of 
pregnancy because it is "dangerous, to the fetus especially, not to take action simply 
because proteinuria has not yet developed." (emphasis added) Williams Obstetrics. 
18th Ed., Cunningham, MacDonald & Gant, Appleton & Lange, 1989, p. 655 (Chapter 
35 entitled "Hypertensive Disorders in Pregnancy,11 is attached as Appendix 1 to 
Appellant's Brief). This contextual language is discussed at length in Appellant's Brief, 
pps. 30-33. 
Dr. Wilde's brazen quotation of Williams out of context is a microcosm 
of the entire case. One gets an inaccurate picture by reading quotes out of context. 
Clearly Williams does not support Dr. Wilde's position that there is a school of thought 
that justifies inaction in the face of rising blood pressure such as experienced by Rivera 
prior to her eclamptic seizures. 
Dr. Wilde then claims on page 26 of his Brief that "the literature" 
establishes that "73% of all women during perfectly normal pregnancies will 
demonstrate a rise in blood pressure of at least 15 mm diastolic or 30 mm systolic." 
Id. Dr. Wilde is relying on one article, for this claim-not upon multiple sources as 
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implied. Indeed, Dr. Wilde seems to represent in his Brief that all literature supports 
this finding, which is simply not true. 
Again, on page 26 of his Brief, defendant claims that Rivera had no 
proteinuria. This is true as of the time she last saw Dr. Wilde, but inaccurately 
represents her ultimate condition, at the time of her convulsions. Rivera's case was not 
one where she had no symptoms prior to fulmination of eclampsia as Dr. Wilde implies. 
Instead at the time of her admission to the hospital, eight days after her last appointment 
with Dr. Wilde, she had pitting edema of 3 +, protein in the urine of 4+ and extremely 
high blood pressure of 206/112. See Trial Exhibit 1, page 91. All of these symptoms 
could have been easily detected prior to the time Rivera fulminated, had she been 
followed more closely. Even Dr. Wilde's own expert witness, Dr. Farnsworth, 
admitted that Brenda's proteinuria could have been detected prior to her convulsions if 
she had been examined each day after her last visit on June 15th, 1989. Dr. 
Farnsworth's deposition testimony was read into the record as follows: 
Mr. Sykes: 3, Line 8. [reading from the Dr. Farnsworth's deposition]: 
"Do you agree that if Dr. Wilde had brought that patient in every day 
from 6-15 on, at some point he likely would have found proteinuria? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you read her medical records from the University of Utah 
Hospital? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't it likely that he would have found that developing somewhere 
along the line? At some time? 
A. Yes, it is." 
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Farnsworth T. 1188:25, 1189:1-13. 
E. Erroneous Claim That Appellant Advocates Strict Liability 
Dr. Wilde asserts that appellant is seeking to overturn the whole history 
of Utah law with regard to medical malpractice. This is another straw-man argument. 
On the contrary, Rivera seeks to present for the review of the court the largely 
undisputed evidence regarding the unsafe nature of Dr. Wilde's claimed "school of 
thought." There is no substantial evidence to support the court's finding that the school 
of thought to which the Dr. Wilde adhered was safe. This was established at trial by 
expert testimony and was well-supported by dozens of articles and book chapters from 
learned medical literature, and by the defendant's own admissions. 
Under Utah law the trier of fact determines the breach of defendant's 
duty, and consequently, the applicable standard of care. Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 
1322, 1328 fn. 5 (Utah App. 1993) ("Utah courts have previously considered the issue 
of negligence, or breach of a legal duty, to be a question of fact."). It is typical in a 
medical malpractice case for the parties to be in disagreement over the standard of care. 
The fact-finder must determine from the competing theories which standard of care is 
established by the preponderance of evidence.10 If the evidence is insufficient to support 
a finding, the verdict should be reversed. The trial court's finding of a safe standard 
here is "clearly erroneous," based upon the undisputed, marshaled evidence. This is all 
completely in conformance with well-established Utah law. 
10
 "No matter how arcane the subject matter or how erudite the witness, the jury is not required 
to accept the expert's testimony as conclusive. The jurors may give such testimony any weight they choose, 
including no weight at all." Dixon v. Stewart. 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982) 
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Defendant further alleges that appellant is urging the court to adopt strict 
liability for medical practitioners. Not true! She does, however, urge the court to 
examine the safety of a custom that allows a woman with signs and symptoms of 
preeclampsia to go unmonitored for a long period of time, while waiting for a late-
developing sign (proteinuria) before her obstetrician takes any action. The alternative 
to this dangerous custom is not strict liability, but is a requirement that a woman with 
a 24-point spike in the diastolic blood pressure, a spike in weight gain, and complaints 
of edema, be warned of the signs and symptoms of preeclampsia so that she can be 
aware of developing problems, and that the obstetrician monitor the woman's condition 
until the blood pressure returns to normal, or until the patient develops further signs of 
the disease justifying hospitalization. This is a far cry from strict liability. 
Dr. Wilde incorrectly alleges that appellant would require obstetricians 
to monitor two-thirds of all their patients every six hours during the entire last trimester 
of their pregnancies. Wilde's Brief at 26. Nonsense. First of all, defendant's statistic 
of two-thirds of all patients having this blood pressure is contrary to his own figure of 
35%. Dr. Wilde surveyed his own patients and found that 35% showed a rise in blood 
pressure of 15 diastolic or 30 systolic. Wilde T. 1263. But note: Brenda Rivera had 
a 24-point DBP increase. Dr. Wilde himself thought she had preeclampsia when he 
walked into the examination room that day. Wilde T. 1297-8. Interestingly, Dr. Wilde 
provides m statistics for patients who have a 24-point increase in diastolic pressure, 
with an 8-pound weight gain in V/i weeks, on which he initially suspected 
preeclampsia. Such a figure would probably be significantly lower. 
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It should hardly be a burden for Dr. Wilde, as a well-paid obstetrician, 
to monitor the few patients he believes may be developing preeclampsia. He testified 
that he did 20-25 deliveries per month. If he charged $1,200 for each delivery, he 
would gross $24,000 - $30,000 per month just from the obstetric practice, not to 
mention the gynecological practice. It shouldn't be difficult to afford sufficient 
personnel to monitor the blood pressure and protein of the few patients that Dr. Wilde 
originally believes may be preeclamptic. 
Second, the risk factors which were operating in Brenda Rivera's case 
must be reviewed to show that she was not just like two-thirds, or even one-third of all 
of defendant's obstetrical patients. In the first place, as pointed out above, Brenda, had 
a 24-point spike in diastolic blood pressure-something far more serious than a rise of 
just 15 points. In addition, Brenda had an 8-pound weight gain and edema, two factors 
which combine to make her situation different from the studies of blood pressures alone. 
He initially suspected preeclampsia. Furthermore, Brenda's prenatal questionnaire 
indicated that she had a family history of vascular disease because of her mother's high 
blood pressure and a sister who had a stroke. Had Dr. Wilde made some inquiries, he 
could have determined that Brenda's sister was hospitalized for pregnancy-induced 
hypertension. Exhibit 39. Brenda was not a low-risk patient, as admitted by the 
defendant himself and his expert: 
Q. (By Mr. Sykes) Would that [family history, in Exhibit 39] justify 
putting that person in a higher risk category? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Sure would. That wouldn't be a low risk case would it? 
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A. (No response) 
Q. Would it? 
A. Well, there again, you said higher risk category. I think your index 
of concern would go up some, whether it's a high risk or not, I can't 
quantify that. 
Q. What about intermediate risk? 
A. She's someone that you would certainly want to watch closely. 
FarnsworthT. 1138, 1139:10-23. 
In addition, preeclampsia is almost entirely a disease of the first 
pregnancy. Williams Obstetrics at 656. Appendix 1 (Appellant's Brief); Wade T. 875:2 
This is another factor which set Brenda apart from many of Dr. Wilde's other prenatal 
patients. Obviously not all of Dr. Wilde's patients were pregnant for the first time-in 
fact, probably a significant percentage are not primigravidas (first pregnancy). Because 
of this, those patients would not require the close monitoring that Brenda required 
because of her family history, her status as a high risk patient and her status as a 
primigravida. 
Finally, consider the de minimis requirements for "monitoring." The 
main factors in Dr. Wilde's own "definition" are extremely easy to monitor or even 
self-monitor. The Smiths grocery stores have blood pressure cuffs at the pharmacy 
counter. Dip sticks for detecting protein in urine are inexpensive. All Dr. Wilde had 
to do is tell Brenda to come back a day or two later so that his nurse could check the 
blood pressure and urine, perhaps a 3 minute job. He wouldn't even have to see her. 
Surely, at least that was called for by the undisputed evidence. 
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Dr. Wilde's "scare tactics" in which a huge percentage of patients would 
have to be constantly monitored by Utah's obstetricians is a gross exaggeration. 
F. Conclusion 
In conclusion, Dr. Wilde's inaccurate statements and portrayals of the 
record and case law are numerous and serious. They present a seriously flawed and 
unreliable picture of the evidence at trial. 
REPLY POINT III 
DR. WILDE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
SAFETY. IT IS NOT SAFE TO WAIT FOR 
PROTEINURIA OR A 140/90 BLOOD PRESSURE 
BEFORE TAKING ACTION TO PROTECT A 
PATIENT. 
The venerable legal principle of "estoppel by silence" holds that estoppel 
"arises where [a] person is under duty to another to speak or failure to speak is 
inconsistent with honest dealings." Black's Law Dictionary. 5th Ed. p. 1239 (West 
Publishing Company 1979). English novelist Robert Louis Stevenson once said "the 
crudest lies are often told in silence. "n 
Dr. Wilde utterly ignores the safety issue because his position, from the 
standpoint of safety, is indefensible. The entirety of Appellant's Brief is devoted to the 
proposition that Dr. Wilde's bright-line standard for diagnosing preeclampsia is unsafe 
because many women can develop preeclampsia or eclampsia without ever having 
proteinuria or a blood pressure of 140/90. A vast body of evidence shows that between 
1 1
 From Truth of Intercourse. 
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10% and 20% of preeclamptic women never have proteinuria. Appellant's Brief, pp. 
28-32. Yet in the face of this "accusation" of "unsafe," Dr. Wilde's response is 
tantamount to silence. Dr. Wilde never demonstrates any evidence that his standard is 
"safe." His only response is that appellant failed to marshal the evidence and that local 
custom supports his clinical definition. In fact, Dr. Wilde uses some derivation of the 
word "safe" only five or six times in the entire brief (Wilde's Brief, pp. 13, 15, 21, 22 
and 25), but, in each instance, he is merely quoting or repeating the court's Finding 11. 
Dr. Wilde's lack of attempt to prove a "safe" standard is strange in the face of 
appellant's claim of insufficiency of evidence to support that Finding. Furthermore, Dr. 
Wilde never responds to Rivera's argument that he employs a "research definition," 
which provides only a "presumptive diagnosis." Appellant's Brief, pp. 36-40. There 
is no response but silence to Rivera's challenge that a doctor can't wait for 140/90 plus 
proteinuria before he acts. Dr. Wilde's failure to deal with this issue is an admission 
that his position is indefensible. 
REPLY POINT IV 
DR. WADE WAS WELL QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY 
AND HIS TESTIMONY WAS WELL-SUPPORTED 
BY THE MEDICAL LITERATURE. 
Contrary to Defendant's claims, Dr. Wade was well-qualified to testify 
regarding the standard of care with regard to preeclampsia. Dr. Wade had been a full-
time instructor at Yale University for six years. Wade T. 840, 841. He was a 
professor of obstetrics at U.C.L.A. for 19 years. Wade T. 841. He delivered 10-15 
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babies per month while at Yale, Wade T. 842, and one to two babies per month while 
at U.C.L.A., while also participating in numerous deliveries each day in his role as 
instructor. Wade T. 843. He testified that he had treated numerous patients with 
severe pregnancy complications including hypertension and eclamptic convulsions. 
Wade T. 844. Dr. Wade was head of the department of Obstetrics at Cedars-Sinai 
Medical Center for 19 years, and supervised the residents there. Any problem with a 
pregnant patient at that hospital was immediately referred to him for consultation, or to 
the one other professor there. Wade T. 846. Dr. Wade was chair of the Medical 
Quality Review Committee of the Medical Board of California whose purpose was to 
insure quality of medical care. Wade T. 846. The Committee acts as judge and jury 
in questions of licensing and malpractice. Wade T. 847. With such qualifications and 
experience, it is no wonder that upon concluding his career as an active obstetrician, 
Dr. Wade is in demand as an expert witness. 
Dr. Wade's testimony was well-supported by the medical literature which 
warns of the dangers of rising blood pressure and the necessity of close monitoring 
when diastolic blood pressure rises in conjunction with edema and weight gain. 
Citations to the record where Dr. Wade read from 28 separate learned treatises in the 
medical literature are found at page 41 in Appellant's Brief. The literature makes it 
clear why the appellant's position is the only tenable standard of care for Utah: to wait 
for proteinuria is to wait for a symptom which may never occur. Dr. Wilde would 
allow a diagnosable condition to go untreated simply for the convenience of a busy 
practitioner who needs "cutoffs" to practice "triage" with a large practice. 
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Finally, Dr. Wade's testimony is buttressed by the many important 
admissions of the defendant and his expert, Dr. Farnsworth, that preeclampsia and 
eclampsia can occur without the presence of proteinuria. These admissions are 
discussed at pp. 30 and 31 of Appellant's Brief. The most important aspects of 
appellant's evidence are uncontested, and therefore cannot be dismissed even if Dr. 
Wade's testimony is found to be unpersuasive. The evidence admitted by Dr. 
Farnsworth and Dr. Wilde cannot be ignored, and has serious, far-reaching implications 
for the women of Utah. Because Dr. Wade was well qualified to testify, because his 
testimony was well-supported by the medical literature, and because the defendant and 
his expert agreed upon key points that support the appellant's case, the defendant's 
position is clearly erroneous and unsafe. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Undisputed evidence, corroborated by defendant and his expert, Dr. 
Farnsworth as well as all of the medical literature, establishes that pregnant women may 
develop preeclampsia and eclampsia without ever having proteinuria and without ever 
having a blood pressure of 140/90. It is unsafe for Dr. Wilde to wait for something 
that may never occur before he treats, monitors or warns about this life-threatening 
condition. Accordingly, it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that Dr. 
Wilde's standard was safe just because the presumptive diagnosis definition is accepted 
by other doctors and other doctors may practice Dr. Wilde's unsafe standard. 
Accordingly, this case should be reversed and remanded. 
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DATED this 31st day of March, 1994. 
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